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Abstract. This paper discusses the distribution of positive and negative adjectives in 
subcomparatives with an absolute comparison interpretation, including cross-polar 
nomalies and anomalies (see Bierwisch 1989, Kennedy 1997, 2001, Büring 2007). It 
offers an analysis of these phenomena in terms of a more constrained variant of Klein’s 
(1980, 1982) degree-less analysis of comparatives, as presented in Doetjes, 
Constantinescu & Součková (to appear). The paper attempts to derive the properties of  
subcomparatives from independently motivated properties of measures. 
 
Keywords: subcomparatives, degrees, vague predicate analysis, cross-polar (a)nomalies, 
measures, interpretation of numerals 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Some adjectives can be modified by degree expressions while others cannot. Take for 
instance the example in (1), which shows that the adjectives tall and difficult are gradable, 
while parliamentary  is not (see for instance Bolinger 1972). 
 
(1) a. taller, more difficult 
 b. #more parliamentary 
 
The example in (1b) is odd, and can only be understood if we manage to reinterpret the 
adjective in such a way that it gets a gradable meaning. Degree expressions, such as the 
comparative, are sensitive to the presence or absence of gradability. As such, the way 
their semantics is defined depends on the way gradability is represented. 
As often noted, gradability is not uniquely an adjectival property (see among others 
Bolinger 1972 and Sapir 1944). Nouns such as idiot and verbs such as to love are 
generally thought of as being gradable. Given this, the way gradability is represented for 
adjectives has consequences for the representation of gradability for other categories. On 
the other hand, the fact that other categories may be gradable has consequences for the 
way gradability is represented in adjectives. In this paper, I will follow Doetjes, 
Constantinescu & Součková (to appear), who claim that gradability across categories 
offers an argument in favor of a maximally simple approach to gradability in the 
adjectival system, which is a degree-less approach.  
Much research on gradable adjectives and comparatives has been implemented in 
degree-based approaches, which have been quite successful in explaining a number of 
phenomena, such as properties of special types of comparatives. One phenomenon that 
has been recently argued to offer evidence in favor of a degree-based system and against 
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 a Klein-style approach are so-called cross polar anomalies. As argued by Kennedy (1997), 
subcomparatives such as that in (2a) normally involve two adjectives of the same polarity. 
According to Kennedy, this can be explained within a degree-based approach that 
represents positive and negative degrees in a different way, and as such turns them into 
sortally different objects. As a result, his theory predicts positive (POS) and negative (NEG) 
adjectives to introduce ‘incommensurable’ degrees and thus he can account for the 
anomaly of sentences such as (2b). 
 
(2) a. The table is longer than the desk is wide   POS-POS 
 b. #The table is longer than the desk is narrow  POS-NEG 
 
Kennedy argues that a degree-less approach to comparatives, and more in particular 
Klein’s version of it, cannot handle this type of data. In this paper, I will sketch a recent 
implementation of a degree-less analysis of comparatives based on Doetjes, 
Constantinescu & Součková (to appear). As compared to Klein’s theory, this analysis is 
more similar to degree-based approaches. I will show how this analysis can handle the 
phenomena described by Kennedy without making use of degrees. As I will argue, the 
grammaticality patterns that we find for this type of sentences cannot be explained by one 
single factor. Rather, various factors conspire, resulting in a rather complicated pattern of 
judgments that may vary from one speaker to another. 
 
 
2. Background: degree based vs. degree-less approaches 
 
In the literature on gradable adjectives, there are two main views on how the gradability 
of adjectives is represented. These can be roughly distinguished as degree based 
approaches versus degree-less approaches. According to first type of approach, the 
meaning of a gradable adjective is defined in terms of degrees (cf. Cresswell 1976, von 
Stechow 1984, Kennedy 1997, Heim 2000). Usually the adjective denotes a relation 
between individuals and degrees.
1
 Within degree-less approaches the adjective is always 
an ordinary predicate, albeit a vague one (Klein 1980, 1982, Van Rooij 2008). The two 
approaches are illustrated in (3): 
 
(3) John is tall 
 a. John is tall to a degree d 
 b. John is a member of a (contextually determined) set of tall people 
 
Within the vague predicate analysis, adjectives are of type <e,t>. The main difference 
between gradable adjectives as in (1a) and non gradable ones as in (1b) lies in the fact 
that the sets defined by gradable adjectives are ordered, while non gradable adjectives 
define unordered sets. 
Within a degree based approach, gradable adjectives and non gradable adjectives are 
of different types. If the gradable adjective is defined as a relation between individuals 
and degrees, the adjective is of type <d, <e,t>>, as opposed to non gradable adjectives, 
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 which are ordinary predicates of type <e,t>. In the course of the derivation, the gradable 
adjective is turned into an ordinary predicate. This is taken care of by an overt degree 
expression, such as the comparative morpheme –er in taller. In the absence of an overt 
degree expression, this change of type is due to the presence of the empty element pos, 
which was first introduced by Cresswell (1976). Besides the fact that pos changes the 
type of the gradable adjective, it also makes sure that the adjective in its positive form 
receives a non neutral or evaluative interpretation. This interpretation is illustrated in (4): 
 
(4) a. John is [pos tall] 
b. John is taller than a contextually determined standard of tallness 
 
In this respect the positive (tall) differs from the comparative (taller), which may have a 
neutral interpretation as illustrated in (5): 
 
(5) John is taller than Peter is  →/    John is tall 
 
In Klein’s framework, pos is not necessary, as adjectives such as tall are interpreted as 
the property of being tall, where what counts as tall depends on the context. In the 
comparative sentence in (5), ‘what counts as tall’ is defined in such a way that John is tall 
and Peter is not. 
 
 
3. A new way of implementing a degree-less approach 
 
Doetjes, Constantinescu & Součková (to appear) (henceforth DCS) argue that Klein’s 
degree-less approach, even though it is very attractive, has a number of problems degree 
based approaches do not have. In order to see this, the examples in (6) and (7) give the 
comparative in a standard degree based framework (taken from Kennedy & McNally 
2005: 369) and the definition of the comparative according to Klein (1982: 127): 
 
(6) a. [[-er/more than dc]] = λAλx.∃d [ d ≻ dc  ∧ A(d)(x) ] 
 b. Alice is taller than Carmen is [AP e] 
c. ∃d [d  ≻ dc  ∧  tall(d)(Alice)] 
 (where dc is the maximal degree such that Carmen is d-tall) 
 
(7) a. x0 >ζ x1 iff ∃d[(d(ζ))(x0) ∧ ¬(d(ζ))(x1)] 
(where >ζ defines the comparative relation for a vague predicate ζ, and d 
is a degree function / delineator) 
 b. Chris is taller than Alex is [AP e] 
 c. ∃d[(d(tall)) (Chris) ∧ ¬(d(tall)) (Alex)] 
 
Whereas a degree-based approach treats the comparative in terms of a comparison 
between two degrees (in (6) the degree of tallness corresponding to Alice and the degree 
of tallness corresponding to Carmen), Klein defines the comparative in terms of 
conjunction and negation. Informally speaking, the formula in (7c) states that there exists 
a function d such that if we apply it to tall, Chris is in d(tall), and Alex is not.  
    Even though Klein’s theory has the advantage of providing a maximally simple theory 
of gradability, DCS argue that Klein fails to account for certain linguistic properties of 
than-clauses, while these same properties follow from standard degree-based approaches. 
More in particular, than-clauses are usually claimed to contain an operator variable 
structure: they may contain an overt operator, and they exhibit locality violations that are 
typical for operator variable structures (see Bresnan 1975, Chomsky 1977, Izvorski 1995 
and DCS to appear). This property of than-clauses is reflected in degree-based 
approaches, in which the than-clause involves abstraction over degrees. Within Klein’s 
proposal it is not, as the than-clause does not abstract over anything 
  DCS opt for a revised version of Klein’s theory which makes use of comparison of 
degree functions. Turning back to the formula in (7a), one can observe that this definition 
of the comparative only works if the set of ds we can choose from is constrained. Imagine 
there was a d such that Chris would be d(tall) and Alex would not, and there was also 
another d such that Alex would be d(tall) and Chris would not. If this were possible, the 
system would make the prediction that both sentences in (8) could be true at the same 
time, which is obviously an undesirable result: 
 
(8) a.  Chris is taller than Alex is 
 b. Alex is taller than Chris is 
 
To avoid this, Klein adopts the Consistency Postulate (CP) in (9) (Klein 1982:126): 
 
(9) Consistency Postulate (CP) 
∀x0∀x1∀Q[∃d[(d(Q))(x0) ∧ ¬ d(Q)) (x1)] → ∀d[(d(Q))(x1) → d(Q)) (x0)] 
(where Q is a predicate variable) 
 
Informally speaking, the CP states that for all x0 and all x1, if x0 >Q x1, a set that results 
from application of any degree function to Q and that contains x1 also contains x0. 
DCS insist on the fact that the consistency postulate introduces an ordering of degree 
functions. Given this ordering, the vague predicate analysis can be made more similar to 
a degree-based approach, as it is possible to redefine the comparative in terms of a 
comparison of degree functions. As a result DCS’s version of the comparative is much 
more similar to the analysis of the comparative in degree based approaches. Consider first 
figure 1, which visualizes the idea of an ordering between the degree functions, for which 
I will use δ rather than d in order to avoid confusion between degree functions and 
degrees. Because of the CP, all δs are ordered when applied to a given gradable adjective 
A. The CP requires that every δ applies to A in such a way that if an individual x in A is 
included in δ(A), all individuals that are ordered above x will be included in δ(A) as well. 
As the upward arrow indicates, the highest ordered element of A is a, and as a result of 
the CP this element is included in δ1(A) to δ4(A). 
 
 figure 1         δ1(A) δ2(A) δ3(A) δ4(A) 
 A↑     a  
     | 
    b 
     | 
    c 
    | 
    d 
 
Given this ordering, one may observe that δ1(A) is the most restrictive or most 
informative set, while δ4(A) is the least restrictive or least informative set, while δ3(A) is 
less restrictive or informative than δ1(A) and δ2(A) and more restrictive or informative 
than δ4(A). This is the ordering property DCS make use of in their definition of the 
comparative. I will introduce here a slightly adapted version of their proposal.
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(10) δ1 >A δ2  iff  δ1(A) ⊂ δ2(A) 
 
The than-clause defines the maximally informative (i.e. most restrictive) degree 
function that, when applied to A, results in a set including its subject. In order for the 
comparative to be true, there should be a more informative degree function that, when 
applied to A, includes the subject of the main clause. This is illustrated in (11), where the 
than-clause defines the maximally informative degree function δ such that Carmen is 
δ(tall). If in figure 1 A is tall, a is Alice and c is Carmen, the sentence will come out as 
true, as the maximally informative δ such that δ(tall) includes Carmen (c) is δ3, and there 
is a more informative δ such that δ(tall) includes Alice (a) (δ1 or δ2). 
 
(11) a. Alice is taller than Carmen is 
 b. [[more/–er]] = λAλQλx.∃δ[(δ(A))(x) & δ >A Q(A)]
3
 
 c. [[than Carmen is]] = λA(MAXA(λδ(δ(A))(Carmen))) 
 d. [[taller than Carmen is]] =  
λQλx.∃δ1[(δ1(tall))(x) & δ1 >tall Q(tall)](λA(MIN(λδ2(δ2(A))(Carmen)))) 
λx.∃δ1[(δ1(tall))(x) & δ1 >tall λA(MAXA(λδ2(δ2(A))(Carmen)))(tall)] 
λx.∃δ1[(δ1(tall))(x) & δ1 >tall MAXtall(λδ2(δ2(tall))(Carmen))] 
 
The than-clause in (11) is defined in such a way that the adjective in the main clause is 
copied to the than-clause. Given the definition in (10), the comparison of the two degree 
functions is unproblematic, as the ordering is defined with respect to one single adjective. 
However, in subcomparatives with two different adjectives the comparison between the 
two degree functions is less straightforward. When a degree function is defined as ‘the 
maximally informative δ such that x is δ(A)’, and A is different from the adjective in the 
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 main clause, the than-clause does not give sufficient information in order to interpret the  
degree function with respect to the adjective in the main clause. Take for example the 
subcomparative in (12): 
 
(12) The desk is longer than the table is wide 
 
All we know about the degree function provided by the than-clause is that it is the 
maximally informative degree function that, when applied to wide, includes the table. In 
order to interpret the comparative, we have to apply it to long as well. 
In order to make the analysis work for sentences such as (12), one needs degree 
functions that are intrinsically ordered. As they are ordered independently of the adjective 
they apply to, the can always be compared. DCS assume that it is possible to use degree 
functions based on a measure. Measures have an intrinsic order they inherit from the 
numerical system, and as such they are always ordered in the same way (even though I 
will argue below that the order may be reversed under certain conditions). The 
independent ordering of these functions makes it possible to bring into play a comparison 
between individuals that are characterized by different adjectives. Obviously, these 
degree functions are only compatible with subcomparatives with two dimensional 
adjectives that make use of the same measurement system, as otherwise the measures 
cannot be interpreted. 
   The analysis is exemplified in (13): 
 
(13) a. [[more/–er]] = λAλδ2λx.∃δ1[(δ1(A))(x) & δ1 >A δ2] 
 b. [[than the table is wide]] = MAXwide(λδ(δ(wide))(table)) = measure 
 c. [[longer than the table is wide]]  = 
  λAλδ2λx.∃δ1[(δ1(A))(x) & δ1 >A δ2](long) 
  λδ2λx.∃δ1[(δ1(long))(x) & δ1 >long δ2]( MAXwide(λδ(δ(wide))(table))) 
  λx.∃δ1[(δ1(long))(x) & δ1 >long MAXwide(λδ2(δ2(wide))(table))] 
 
DCS argue that in addition to this type a second type exists that involves degree functions 
such as quite, very and extremely. Again, the ordering of these functions is independent of 
the adjective to which they are applied (extremely > very > quite, that is, e.g. extremely is 
more informative than very etc.; this ordering is also responsible for introducing scalar 
implicatures; see Horn 1972), but unlike the measures, these degree functions are not 
limited to dimensional adjectives. The example in (14a) is taken from Bale (2006), the 
analysis has been adapted from DCS: 
 
(14) a. If Esme chooses to marry funny but poor Ben over rich but boring  
  Steve, then there can be only one explanation: Ben must be funnier  
  than Steve is rich. 
 b. [[more/–er ]] = λAλδ2λx.∃δ1[(δ1(A))(x) & δ1 >A δ2] 
 c. [[than Steve is rich]] = MAXrich(λδ(δ(rich))(Steve)) = a δ such as very 
 d. e.g. if Steve is very rich, Ben has to be extremely funny 
 
 In what follows, I will mostly discuss subcomparatives such as the one in (12), for which 
I will use the term ‘absolute comparison’. I refer the reader to DCS and Bale (2006, 2008) 
for discussion of cases such as (14) (‘relative comparison’). 
 
 
4. Cross polar anomalies 
 
4.1 Cross polar anomalies and the vague predicate analysis 
 
As Kennedy (1997, 2001) notices, subcomparatives with dimensional adjectives give rise 
to so called cross polar anomalies. This is illustrated in (15). In (15a) the two adjectives 
are of the same polarity, and the sentence is fine, while (15b) and (15c) are anomalous: 
 
(15) a. The desk was longer than the table was wide  OK  POS-POS 
 b. ?Alice is taller than Carmen is short  ANOMALY  POS-NEG  
 c. ?Alice is shorter than Carmen is tall  ANOMALY  NEG-POS 
 
Kennedy (1997) argues that this is problematic for Klein, as he would predict (15b) and 
(15c) to be fine, and to have the same meaning as an ordinary comparative without the 
second adjective (Alice is taller/shorter than Carmen is). Kennedy’s argument goes like 
this. Given Klein’s definition in (7) above, (15b) would come out as true if Alice is taller 
than Carmen, as illustrated in (16). The scenario in (16) shows that there exists a d such 
that Alice is in the positive extension of d(tall), while Carmen is in the negative extension 
of d(short), and this is what (16a) requires. As such, the sentence in (15b) is predicted to 
be fine, contrary to fact. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for (15c). 
 
(16) a. ∃d[(d(tall))(Alice) & ~(d(short))(Carmen)] 
 b. Dtall = < a, b, Carmen, c, Alice >, where Alice is the tallest 
  Dshort = < Alice, c, Carmen, b, a >, where a is the shortest 
posd(tall) = <Carmen, c, Alice >  
negd(tall) = <a, b> 
posd(short) = <b, a > 
negd(short) = <Alice, c, Carmen > 
 
Kennedy concludes that cross polar anomaly is an argument in favour of a degree based 
approach, and more in particular of an approach in which positive and negative degrees 
are sortally different objects, which prevents them from being compared (see Kennedy 
1997, 2001 for details). 
However, one could object to this that (16) is only one part of the truth (see 
Constantinescu et al. 2009). Suppose the positions of Alice and Carmen are swapped, in 
such a way that Alice has exactly the height Carmen had in the other scenario and vice 
versa. The same d can again be applied, as illustrated in (17): 
 
(17)  Dtall = < a, b, Alice, c, Carmen >, where Carmen is the tallest 
 Dshort = < Carmen, c, Alice, b, a >, where a is the shortest 
posd(tall) = < Alice, c, Carmen >  
 negd(tall) = < a, b > 
posd(short) = < b, a > 
negd(short) = < Carmen, c, Alice > 
 
In this scenario, Carmen is taller than Alice. Yet, only the scenario has been changed: the 
person we called Alice in the first scenario now is called Carmen and the other way 
around, which does not affect the degree function. The reason why this is possible is that 
the degree function in (16a) needs to yields a positive value for (d(tall)) applied to Alice 
and a negative value for (d(short)) applied to Carmen. As (16b) and (17) show, the d 
defined in these examples does so independently of the ordering between Alice and 
Carmen. As a result, this d does not give any information about Alice’s height as 
compared to Carmen’s height. 
To understand why the d in these examples behaves like this, one has to realize that a 
change in the order of Dtall implies the opposite change in the order of Dshort. If applied to 
the example in (15b), Klein’s formula requires Alice to be in the positive extension of 
d(tall) (that is, posd(tall)) and Carmen in the negative extension of d(short) (negd(short)). 
The latter condition does not exclude that Carmen is in the extension of posd(tall) as well. 
Moreover, the relative order of Carmen and Alice in posd(tall) is irrelevant as already 
indicated above. This means that there is no d that determines the relative ordering of 
Carmen and Alice in either Dtall or Dshort, unless posd(tall) is a singleton set. In that case 
Alice still has to be in posd(tall), but this time Carmen cannot be in posd(tall) as well. As 
a result, Carmen needs to be shorter than Alice. The meaning of this d would be similar to 
the meaning of the superlative, as it would require a scenario in which Alice is the tallest 
person, while Carmen is in the negative extension of d(short). 
At this point, one could argue that Klein’s theory does account for the anomaly of 
(15b): there exist quite a number of relevant degree functions but almost all of them are 
uninformative. The existence of these uninformative degree functions may be the cause 
of the anomaly of the sentence.
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However, the sentences in (15b,c) are not simply out; they can marginally have a 
reading similar to the example in (14). A German example discussed by Bierwisch 
(1989:105) is given in (18). As Bierwisch notes,  this sentence can be marginally 
interpreted as follows: the difference between Hans’ height and the standard for tallness 
exceeds the difference between Eva’s height and the standard for shortness: 
 
(18) Hans is größer als Eva klein ist  
‘Hans is taller than Eva is short’  
 
The problem is that Klein cannot account for this reading. In this case, too, the effect 
described above applies. Degree functions that makes [(d(tall))(Alice) & 
~(d(short))(Carmen)] true are uninformative (with one exception as discussed above), as 
they do not say anything about the relative order between Hans and Eva in terms of their 
height. If these uninformative ds lead to anomaly, (18) should be anomalous under the 
reading described by Bierwisch as well. 
                                                 
4
 Alternatively, one could argue that this should force the sentence to have the superlative interpretation, 
this being the only informative interpretation. I will not consider this possibility. 
 One could conclude that Klein’s theory does account for the anomaly of (15b,c): the 
use of antonyms leads to meaningless comparisons. The problem is rather that sentences 
such as the ones in (15b,c) are predicted not to be interpretable at all, while in fact they 
(marginally) have a norm related reading (see DCS for discussion). This problem is 
related to the lack of a restriction on the interpretation of the than-clause. The only thing 
Klein’s analysis requires is that the subject of the than-clause fall in the negative 
extension of d(A), where A is the predicate of the than-clause. As shown in the previous 
section, the alternative to Klein presented in DCS is more restrictive. In the next two 
sections it will be argued that this analysis can account for cross polar anomalies. 
 
5.2 Restrictions on adjective combinations in subcomparatives 
 
Before going over to an analysis of cross polar anomalies, it is necessary to look at the 
data in more detail, as these are more complicated in two respects. In the first place, there 
also exist cross polar nomalies (the term comes from Büring 2007; the phenomenon is 
also discussed by Bierwisch 1989). Moreover, comparatives with two negative adjectives 
are not that good (see Bierwisch 1989). Both facts are unexpected under the proposal 
made by Kennedy. For him a positive and a negative degree should never be comparable. 
On the other hand, the comparison of two negative degrees should be unproblematic. 
 Let us first have a look at cross polar nomalies. These are sentences that have a 
negative adjective in the main clause, and a positive adjective in the than-clause. 
Moreover, Büring notes that the two adjectives should not be antonyms of one another, as 
illustrated by the contrast between (19a,b): 
 
(19) a. Unfortunately, the ladder was shorter than the house was high  
b. ?*Unfortunately, the hose is shorter than the ladder is long 
 
Büring’s (2007) analysis of cross polar nomalies is based on the idea that negative 
adjectives are interpreted as little+A
pos
. Thus, in (19a) the comparative morpheme –er 
applies to little, which is a meaning component of the negative adjective short 
(LITTLE+long), so that the sentence would have the logical structure in (20a). (19b) is 
ruled out, not because of a general ban on cross polar comparisons, but because it 
involves two instances of tall as in (20b). The second adjective should be deleted just as 
in (20c). 
 
(20) a. The ladder is LITTLE-er long than HOW the house is high. 
 b. Carmen is LITTLE-er tall than HOW Alice is tall 
 c. Carmen is taller than Alice is (*tall) 
 
Bierwisch also claims that NEG-POS cases are fine, but he also claims that all cases with 
negative adjectives in the than-clause are excluded. The data in (21) are adapted from 
Bierwisch 1989:105), and include a measure phrase which blocks the norm related 
reading discussed for example (18) above: 
 
(21) a. Der Tisch ist 10cm höher als er breit ist   POS-POS  
  the table is 10 cm higher than it wide is 
  b. 
?
Der Tisch ist 10cm niedriger als er breit ist  
?
NEG-POS 
  the     table is 10 cm lower     than  it wide is  
c. *Der Tisch ist 10cm niedriger als er schmal ist  *NEG-NEG 
  the     table is 10 cm lower than   it narrow is 
 d. *Der Tisch ist 10cm höher als er schmal ist   *POS-NEG 
  the     table is 10 cm higher than it narrow is 
 
Note that the judgments given by Bierwisch and Kennedy differ, as the latter argues that 
there is a contrast between the sentences in (22).  
 
(22) a. Luckily, the ficus turned out to be shorter than the doorway was low 
         NEG-NEG 
 b. #Unfortunately, the ficus turned out to be taller than the ceiling was low 
          *POS-NEG 
 
The discussion of these cases in the literature shows that there is no clear consensus about 
what data should be explained. DCS investigated these sentences both on the basis of 
grammaticality judgments and on the basis of internet searches. The grammaticality 
judgments (from English and Dutch speakers, both groups behaving in a similar way) 
appeared to form a continuum: (ordinary comparatives with one A >) POS-POS > NEG-POS 
> NEG-NEG > POS-NEG. Note that even though there were speakers who preferred NEG-NEG 
over POS-NEG, there were also speakers who accepted the POS-NEG cases. 
Interestingly, the picture that emerged from internet searches turned out to be slightly 
different. Again, POS-POS cases are by far the easiest to find. NEG-POS cases (Büring’s 
cross polar nomalies) can also be found quite easily, but NEG-NEG cases and POS-NEG 
cases are extremely hard to find. We did not find any example of a NEG-NEG case either in 
Dutch or in English.
5
 However, there were a few examples of POS-NEG. Most of these 
examples clearly had a norm related interpretation (see example (18) above), but three of 
them seem to be real life examples of the phenomenon we are interested in. The clearest 
example is given in (23). The sentence is a description of a picture that is called Narrow 
Canyon. As such the context makes it clear that we are dealing with a particularly narrow 
canyon in this case, and this seems to be what licenses the use of the negative adjective in 
the than-clause. The sentence following the subcomparative describes the contents of the 
subcomparative in such a way that a norm related reading is unlikely.  
 
(23) This is a part of the canyon where it is deeper than it is narrow. It's something like  
 1000 ft wide at the top and 1700 ft deep. 
[http://www.worldisround.com/articles/12961/photo6.html] 
 
The difference between informants’ judgments and internet searches is difficult to 
understand, and further research is necessary to shed more light on this issue. Given that 
some speakers accept all types of subcomparatives, it should in principle be possible to 
derive all types while explaining that some cases are more easily derived than others. 
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 Given that only a few (dimensional) adjectives occur in these subcomparatives, it is possible to carry out 
quite exhaustive internet searches. 
 5.3 Measure-based degree functions 
 
DCS argue that the degree functions one makes use of in the derivation of 
subcomparatives with absolute comparison interpretations are based on measures. 
Following Klein (1982: 120-1), DCS assume that a measure in expressions such as five 
foot six in for instance five foot six tall is interpreted as a function h that partitions the 
domain into those individuals that measure at least five foot six and those that do not. 
Measure based degree functions (e.g. two meters, six feet) are inherently ordered with 
respect to one another: their ordering is fixed by the independent ordering of the 
measures they are based on, which in turn is derived from the ordering of the natural 
numbers. Measures require the use of dimensional adjectives, and as a result this way of 
deriving a subcomparative is only available for subcomparatives containing two 
dimensional adjectives. Moreover, these adjectives should correspond to dimensions that 
are compatible with the same type of measurement (e.g. length and width). 
 In the literature on numerals, there is quite a lot of discussion on their basic meaning. 
It has often been claimed that numerals have an at least-interpretation, but may require an 
exactly-reading in certain contexts. According to Horn’s (1972) ‘classical’ neo-Gricean 
analysis, the exactly-reading is triggered by a scalar implicature, triggered by Grice’s 
maxim of Quantity (“Make your contribution as informative as is required”). This is 
illustrated by the – again classical – examples in (24):  
  
(24) a. John has three children and possibly even more/*fewer. 
  b. Q: Does John have three children? 
   A1: No, he has four. 
   A2: Yes, (in fact) he has four 
 
In (24a), the second part of the sentence shows that, at least in this example, the exactly 
reading behaves like an implicature, as it can be cancelled. In (24b), the choice between 
the two answers is a matter of pragmatics. According to the contextual clues, the 
interlocutor will decide whether the first sentence implicates an upper bound or not.
6
  
 Interestingly, numerals may also obtain an at most-reading in a very restricted set of 
contexts. Horn calls this an instance of scale reversal (Horn 1972/76: 34; see also Sadock 
1984, Carston 1988  and Atlas 2005 for discussion of these cases): 
 
(25) a. Arnie is capable of breaking 70 on this course, if not 65/*75 
  b. U.S. troop strength in Vietnam was down to 66,300 thus exceeding Mr.  
   Nixon’s pledge of 69,000 (L.A. Times, cited by B.H. Partee) 
 
In the first example, the fact that we are talking about golf ensures that the sentence 
introduces an asserted upper bound and implicated lower bound. However, as Horn 
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 There is quite some discussion in the literature on the status of the exactly-reading. The answer 2 in (24b) 
is a classical cancellation of an implicature, and as such, it seems true that this reading may be an 
implicature. However, in other cases the exactly reading seems to correspond to the meaning of the cardinal. 
As Horn (1992) puts it, “an n-sided figure is one that is semantically constrained to have exactly (not at 
least) n sides”.  See Geurts & Van der Slik (2005) for a recent overview of this discussion. As the analysis 
of the exactly- reading is not relevant here, I leave this issue aside.  
 notices, if one takes into account that the scale (or ordering) that is relevant here is 
negative rather than positive, one could also say that these expressions assert a lower 
bound on a negative scale of quantifiers.
7
 That is, given a certain context the 
informativeness of the numerals can be reversed, resulting in a negative scale.  
 It has to be noted that the idea of scale reversal is not uncontroversial. As noticed by 
Sadock (1984), scale reversal is not possible for expressions such as some and all, which 
also form a scale. For some reason, some cannot mean in any context something like at 
most some. According to Atlas, all three interpretations of numerals (at least, at most or 
exactly) have the same status: the numeral is non-specific among these interpretations 
(see Atlas 2005). For the current discussion, it is important that a numeral may have an at 
least or an at most-interpretation depending on the context. I will come back to this below. 
 Turning back to subcomparatives and the interpretation of measure based degree 
functions, it is clear that only two types of interpretations are compatible with the 
consistency postulate in (9). Whenever the function applies to a positive adjective, the at 
least-interpretation is the only possible one, and whenever it applies to a negative 
adjective, the at most-reading is required. This is illustrated by the following figures. 
Figure 2 represents a positive adjective. The bold brackets indicate which individuals 
would be included under an at least-interpretation of the measure. The dotted lines, on 
the other hand, indicate which individuals would be included under an at most-
interpretation of the functions. The consistency postulate requires that, whenever an 
individual is included in δ(tall), all individuals that are ordered above this individual 
should be included in δ(tall) as well. As such, the at least-interpretation is required. In the 
context of a negative adjective, however, one needs an at most-interpretation, as this time 
the individual with the smallest length (that is, the highest ordered individual in the set 
short) has to always be included. In figure 3, the dotted brackets are in accordance with 
the CP and represent the at most-interpretation, δ1(short) being the set of individuals that 
measure at most 1m50. 
 
figure 2     figure 3 
       δ1(tall)  δ2(tall)   δ3(tall)  δ4(tall)     δ1(short) δ2(short) δ3(short) δ4(short) 
         1m85   1m81       1m78     1m74                1m50         1m55        1m60       1m65   
tall ↑     a     short ↑  a      
  |      | 
 b      b 
  |      | 
 c      c 
 |      | 
 d      d 
 
bold bracket: at least/ dotted bracket: at most 
 
It is clear that scale reversal is the marked option. Only strong contextual clues will be 
able to trigger this type of interpretation. Interestingly, negative adjectives seem to be 
able to trigger a scale reversal. This is illustrated by the contrast in (26). 
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 A Horn scale is a set of increasingly informative expressions. Examples are for instance: <some, many, 
most, all> and <or, and> (cf. Geurts in progress). Because of this increasing informativeness, the lowest 
ordered expression implies all the others. As a result, the use of a less informative element on the scale 
implicates that the higher ordered elements cannot be used. 
  
(26) a. How tall is she? She is 1m75, or even a bit taller than that 
b. ?How short is she? She is 1m50, or even a bit shorter than that 
 
Even though a how-question with a negative adjective is not as easily available as the 
corresponding question with a positive adjective, it is clear that, when the measure is used 
in the answer, scale reversal has applied. In what follows, I assume that, whenever a 
measure based degree function is used with a negative adjective, scale reversal has 
applied. A measure based degree function may then be said, in Horn’s terms, to assert a 
lower bound and implicate an upper bound. The ordering direction of the measures 
depends on context: positive adjectives normally trigger the default positive ordering of 
the measures, and negative adjectives trigger a reversed ordering.  
 Let us turn now back to (12) and its derivation in (13d), both repeated in (27): 
 
(27) a. The desk is longer than the table is wide  
 b. [[longer than the table is wide]]  = 
  λAλδ2λx.∃δ1[(δ1(A))(x) & δ1 >A δ2](long) 
  λδ2λx.∃δ1[(δ1(long))(x) & δ1 >long δ2]( MAXwide(λδ(δ(wide))(table))) 
  λx.∃δ1[(δ1(long))(x) & δ1 >long MAXwide(λδ2(δ2(wide))(table))] 
 
This example is straightforward, as the sentence contains two positive adjectives. Let us 
now consider a case of a cross polar nomaly, as in (28): 
 
(28) a. The desk is shorter than the table is wide  
 b. [[shorter than the table is wide]]  = 
  λAλδ2λx.∃δ1[(δ1(A))(x) & δ1 >A δ2](short) 
  λδ2λx.∃δ1[(δ1(short))(x) & δ1 >short δ2]( MAXwide(λδ(δ(wide))(table))) 
  λx.∃δ1[(δ1(short))(x) & δ1 >short MAXwide(λδ2(δ2(wide))(table))] 
 
What we see here, is that the comparison between the two measure based degree is based 
on their interpretation with respect to the adjective in the main clause (δ1 >A δ2), in this 
case short; as such they both should have an at most-type interpretation. On the other 
hand, δ2 originates from the than-clause, where it is defined with respect to the adjective 
wide, which is a positive adjective, and as such triggers an at least-interpretation for the 
measure. To see what this means, let us assume that we are talking about a table that is 90 
centimeters wide. As such δ90_centimeters(wide) includes all objects in the domain that are at 
least 90 centimeters wide. This degree function has to be applied to the negative adjective 
in the main clause, but recall that a negative adjective triggers a scale reversal. As a result, 
assertion of the lower bound will correspond to an at most-interpretation with respect to 
the negative adjective in the main clause. 
Note that Atlas’ (2005) way of accounting for the at least- and the at most-
interpretation would have a similar effect. As indicated above, he treats numerals (and 
thus measures, which contain numerals) as being nonspecific among their three possible 
interpretations (at least n, at most n and exactly n). As a result, one single measure based 
degree function may have the at most-interpretation when applied to a positive adjective 
 and the at least-interpretation when interpreted with respect to a negative adjective, and 
this is what is needed for the analysis of cross-polar nomalies 
This analysis offers an alternative to Büring’s account of cross polar nomalies, and 
also accounts for the fact that cross polar nomalies are more marked than ordinary 
subcomparatives featuring two positive adjectives, as both grammaticality judgments and 
corpus searches suggest. 
So far, the less controversial data have been considered. One may object at this point 
that the possibility of scale reversal predicts all logical combinations to be equally 
possible. This is not in accordance with the data, as negative adjectives in than-clauses 
seem to be much less easily acceptable than negative adjectives in main clauses. In other 
words, at this point we need to account for the difference between NEG-POS and POS-NEG/ 
NEG-NEG. Before going over to an analysis of these issues, one can observe that the 
difference in acceptability between the two types of sentences is correlated with two other 
differences. In the first place, only when a negative adjective is used in the than-clause 
does it introduce the presupposition that A holds of its subject, as illustrated in (29): 
 
(29) a. The canyon is deeper than it is narrow →  the canyon is narrow    POS-NEG  
b. Unfortunately, the ladder was shorter than the house was high  
  →/   the ladder was short              NEG-POS  
 
In the second place, only a negative adjective in the than-clause may be replaced by its 
positive counterpart without changing the truth conditions of the sentence, as illustrated 
by the contrast in (30): 
 
(30) a. The canyon is deeper than it is narrow/wide 
 b. The ladder was shorter/longer than the house was high 
 
The necessarily evaluative reading of examples such as (23) might well be related to the 
lack of a neutral interpretation in equatives with negative adjectives (as short). According 
to Rett (2008), the difference between as tall (which can be neutral or evaluative) and as 
short (only evaluative) follows from  blocking. In principle, the negative and the positive 
adjective have both a non neutral or evaluative reading and a neutral reading. However, 
under the neutral readings of the adjectives the two equative forms have the same 
meaning.
8
 As a result, the neutral reading of short in as short is blocked and only the non 
neutral or evaluative reading remains. This same mechanism can account for the lack of a 
non neutral reading for negative adjectives in the than-clause, while predicting the 
contrast between the sentences in (30). A negative adjective in the main clause is 
predicted to still have a neutral reading, as it cannot be replaced by its positive 
counterpart without changing the truth conditions of the sentence rather drastically. A 
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 Note that this is not completely true. The meaning of the two forms would not be exactly the same, given 
that some form of scale reversal applies in this case as well: while as in as tall has an at least-interpretation, 
as in as short gets an at most-interpretation. Even though this is clearly a problem for Rett, I leave this issue 
here, as the idea behind her approach (the neutral ‘equal length’-reading blocks the use of a negative 
adjective) seems to be intuitively right. Moreover, this does not apply to the subcomparatives that are 
treated here, as the use of either adjective in (30a), given a neutral interpretation of the adjectives, would 
result in an identical meaning. 
 such, no blocking effect is expected in this case. 
Whereas this accounts for the fact that sentences with negative adjectives in the than-
clause trigger an evaluative interpretation of the adjective, this does not account for the 
reduced acceptability of POS-NEG and NEG-NEG sentences. More in particular, one would 
like to know why there is a contrast between as short and subcomparatives with a 
negative adjective in the than-clause: whereas as short is perfectly grammatical, 
subcomparatives with a negative adjective in the than-clause have a reduced acceptability.  
The reason for the contrast may be related to another contrast between equatives and 
adjectives modified by measures. It is clear that as short as well as as tall may have an 
evaluative reading for the adjective. This is for instance illustrated by the fact that as is 
compatible with a for-clause, which explicitly introduces a comparison class, and which 
triggers an evaluative meaning. This is illustrated in (31), a sentence taken from one of 
the Tales from “Blackwood” (see also Bale 2006): 
 
(31)  Captain Gifford is as tall for a man as his wife is for a woman 
 
If a measure is used with a positive adjective, the use of a for-phrase is not allowed, as 
shown in (32a). Moreover, the combination of a measure with a negative adjective is 
strongly disfavoured, as illustrated in (32b). The two examples in (32) do not have 
exactly the same status, for reasons that I do not understand at this point. The example in 
(32b) seems to be better than the one in (32). If one is forced to interpret this sentence, 
only the evaluative interpretation is available: the sentence presupposes that John is short. 
 
(32) a. *Captain Gifford is 1m95 tall for a man 
 b. #John is 1m50 short 
 
This suggests that the dimensional adjectives cannot (or not easily) receive an evaluative 
interpretation.
9
 Turning back to cases such as as short, the use of the equative is 
unproblematic because there are two readings readily available, only one of which is 
blocked. On the other hand, if measures are disfavoured in combination with an 
evaluative interpretation of the adjective, as the examples in (32) strongly suggest, there 
is no fully acceptable alternative to the blocked reading in examples involving a measure 
and a negative adjective. 
The effect obtained in (32b) is similar to the effect in subcomparatives with negative 
adjectives in the than-clause, and seems to be related to the incompatibility of a measure 
and the evaluative interpretation of the adjective. A blocking analysis of the neutral 
reading can account for the contrast between the two examples in (30). The neutral 
reading is reserved to positive adjectives, and to those negative adjectives that cannot be 
replaced by the corresponding positive adjective without altering the meaning of the 
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 The source of this effect (and of the contrast between (32a,b)) is not completely clear to me, even though 
it seems plausible that the preciseness of the measure is incompatible with the context dependency of the 
evaluative interpretation of the adjective.  It might be, as Louise McNally suggested, that dimensional 
adjectives that do combine with measures simply have a different type (see also Schwarzschild 2005). This 
suggestion has a number of advantages but also disadvantages. More in particular, certain expressions such 
as the comparative may combine with both the neutral and the evaluative version of the adjective, which is 
most easily accounted for under the assumption that an adjective with an evaluative interpretation and an 
adjective with a neutral interpretation are of the same type. I leave this as an issue for further research. 
 sentence. This explains why neutral readings do occur for a negative adjective in the main 
clause of (sub)comparatives, as in (30b), but not for a negative adjective that is used in 
the than-clause, as illustrated in (30a). This triggers an evaluative reading for negative 
adjectives in the than-clause, but given the anomaly of the combination of the evaluative 
interpretation of the adjective and a measure, as illustrated in (32), the sentences are 
degraded. 
 A final point to discuss here is the difference between POS-NEG and NEG-NEG. As I 
already indicated, the data are rather difficult to interpreted (more in particular corpus 
data do not confirm the preferences reported by informants). Yet it is clear that some 
speakers report a preference for the NEG-NEG cases, and it would be interesting to see how 
this could be accounted for. A possible source for the preference might be the fact that the 
measure in POS-NEG cases is interpreted differently with respect to the positive and to the 
negative adjective. It is quite plausible that this has an effect on the processing load of the 
sentence. A similar effect on processing load has been reported by Geurts & van der Slik 
(2005), who argue that sentences containing both upward and downward entailing 
quantifiers are more difficult to process than sentences with upward entailing quantifiers 
only. This affects both sentences of the POS-NEG-type and sentences of the NEG-POS-type. 
The latter have an important advantage over the former, though, as the use of the negative 
adjective rather than a positive one is truth conditionally relevant and as such does not 
trigger an independently disfavoured evaluative interpretation of the negative adjective. 
 An important advantage of looking at the data in this way, is that different factors 
influence the grammaticality of the sentences. As such, the fact that people may have 
different judgements can be accounted for. It might even be that certain factors are more 
important to certain speakers than to others. At this point these remarks are rather 
speculative given the fact that the data should be investigated in more detail. However, 
the approach that is taken here makes it possible to account for a number of patterns, and 
to make predictions about what patterns may occur. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper I adopted a revised version of Klein’s degree-less approach to comparatives, 
based on Doetjes, Constantinescu & Součková (to appear) (DCS). This approach, which 
makes use of a comparison of degree functions, inherits certain advantages of degree-
based approaches such as the prediction of the existence of an operator-variable structure 
in than-clauses. I have argued that this approach can account for the use of polar 
opposites and negative adjectives in subcomparatives with an absolute comparison 
reading (cross polar (a)nomalies, see in particular Bierwisch 1989, Kennedy 1997, 2001 
and Büring 2007). 
 The subcomparatives discussed in this paper are subject to gradient acceptability 
judgments. The proposal by DCS makes it possible to account for this variability and to 
connect it to various independent phenomena, such as the interpretation of numerals and 
the incompatibility of evaluative readings and measures. 
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